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Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols make it possible for two quantum parties to generate a secret
shared key. Semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, such as “QKD with classical Bob” and “QKD
with classical Alice” (that have both been proven robust), achieve this goal even if one of the parties is classical.
However, existing SQKD protocols are not experimentally feasible with current technology. Here we suggest a
new protocol, “Classical Alice with a controllable mirror”, that can be experimentally implemented with current
technology (using 4-level systems instead of qubits), and we prove it to be robust.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) makes it possible for two
legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, to generate an information-
theoretically secure key [1], that is secure against any possible
attack (of the adversary Eve) allowed by the laws of quantum
physics. Alice and Bob use an insecure quantum channel and
an authenticated classical channel.
Semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols limit one
of the parties to be classical, while still giving a secure key [2].
As explained in [2, 3], such SQKD protocols are interesting
from both the conceptual and the practical points of view;
moreover, in a network of one quantum center and many clas-
sical “users”, the classical users may even be oblivious to being
involved in a quantum cryptographic protocol.
The first SQKD protocol was “QKD with classical Bob” [2];
later, the “QKD with classical Alice” [4, 5] protocol was sug-
gested, as well as various other SQKD protocols (see for ex-
ample [6–8]). Most of the SQKD protocols have been proven
“robust”: namely [2], any successful attack by an adversary
necessarily induces some noise that the legitimate parties may
notice. A few of them also have their full security analyzed [9].
However, to the best of our knowledge, all the currently ex-
isting SQKD protocols cannot be experimentally constructed
in a secure way by using current technology, because, as ex-
plained below, one of the “classical” operations (SIFT) cannot
be securely implemented.
We present a new and feasible SQKD protocol that can
be experimentally constructed by using a “controllable mir-
ror”. It is based on “QKD with classical Alice” [4, 5], but it is
slightly more complicated, because it uses 4-level systems in-
stead of qubits (2-level systems), and because it requires Alice
to choose one of four operations (instead of two). We prove
this protocol to be robust.
In Sec. II we present the original “QKD with classical Alice”
protocol, and in Sec. III we explain why this protocol and the
other currently existing protocols are experimentally infeasible
with current technology. In Sec. IV we present the “Classical
Alice with a controllable mirror” SQKD protocol, and in Sec. V
we prove it to be robust. We conclude in Sec. VI.
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II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTIONWITH CLASSICAL
ALICE
In the “QKD with classical Alice” protocol [4] (the name is
following [5]), in each round, the originator Bob sends to Alice
the qubit state |+〉. Then, Alice randomly chooses one of two
classical operations: CTRL — reflect the qubit to Bob, or SIFT
— measure the qubit in the computational (i.e., the classical)
basis {|0〉, |1〉} and resend it to Bob. Bob then measures the
qubit he receives from classical Alice, choosing randomly the
measurement basis (the computational basis or the Hadamard
basis {|+〉, |−〉}). After N qubits have been sent and received,
Alice publicly announces her choice (CTRL or SIFT) for each
round, and Bob publicly announces his basis choice for each
round. Then, Alice and Bob check the error rates in the CTRL
bits and in a random subset of the SIFT bits, aborting if they are
too high. Finally, Alice and Bob perform error correction and
privacy amplification on the remaining SIFT bits measured by
Bob in the computational basis, so that they get a final identical
key that is completely secret.
As proven in [5], “QKD with classical Alice” [4] is com-
pletely robust against eavesdropping. The proof of robustness
was extended in [10] to include photonic implementations and
multi-photon pulses.
III. THE EXPERIMENTAL INFEASIBILITY OF THE SIFT
OPERATION IN SQKD PROTOCOLS
In the SQKD protocols (e.g., [2, 4]), one of the “classi-
cal” operations is SIFT: measuring in the computational basis
{|0〉, |1〉} and then resending. In practical (photonic) imple-
mentations, and especially if limited to the existing technology,
the SIFT operation is very hard to securely implement, because
the generated photon will probably be at a different timing or
frequency, thus leaking information to the eavesdropper; see
details in [11] (which is a comment on [2]) and in the reply [12].
For example, let us look at the “QKD with classical Alice”
protocol implemented with two classical modes, |0〉 and |1〉,
describing two pulses (two distinct time-bins) on a single arm.
The photon can be either in one pulse, in the other, or in a
superposition (a non-classical state). In this case, the SIFT
operation requires Alice to measure the two pulses, to gener-
ate a single photon in a state depending on the measurement
outcome, and to resend it to Bob; while Alice can implement
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2the CTRL operation simply by using a mirror (reflecting both
pulses). In this case, it is indeed very difficult for Alice to
regenerate the SIFT photon exactly at the right timing, so that
it is indistinguishable from a CTRL photon.
Furthermore, in [11] it was shown that even if Alice could
(somehow) have the machinery to perform SIFT with perfect
timing, Eve would still be able to attack the protocol by tak-
ing advantage of the fact that Alice’s detectors are imperfect:
Eve’s attack is modifying the frequency of the photon gener-
ated by Bob. Alice does not notice the change in frequency. If
Alice performs SIFT, the photon she generates is in the original
frequency; if she performs CTRL, the photon she reflects is in
the frequency modified by Eve. Therefore, if Eve is powerful
enough, she can measure the frequency and tell whether Alice
used SIFT or CTRL. If Eve finds out that Alice used SIFT, she
can copy the bit sent by Alice in the computational basis; if
she finds out that Alice used CTRL, she shifts the frequency
back to the original frequency. (A very similar attack works for
other implementations, too — e.g., for polarization-based or
phase-based implementations.) This “tagging” attack makes
it possible for Eve to get full information on the key without
inducing noise.
IV. THE CONTROLLABLE MIRROR PROTOCOL FOR
QKDWITH CLASSICAL ALICE
We suggest a new SQKD protocol, similar to “QKD with
classical Alice”, that is experimentally feasible: in the original
protocol of “QKD with classical Alice”, Alice could choose
only between two operations (CTRL and SIFT); in our new
protocol, Alice may choose between four operations (CTRL,
SWAP-10, SWAP-01, and SWAP-ALL). This protocol avoids
the need of using the infeasible operation SIFT. The two op-
erations SWAP-10 and SWAP-01 correspond to two possible
reflections of pulses by using a controllable mirror. Those op-
erations cannot be described by qubit notations, so below we
use 4-level system notations. Our new protocol is based on the
Fock space notations: in those notations, the state |m1,m0〉
represents m1 indistinguishable photons in the mode of the
qubit-state |1〉 and m0 indistinguishable photons in the mode
of the qubit-state |0〉. More details about the Fock space nota-
tions are given in Appendix A.
This protocol is experimentally feasible and is safe against
the “tagging” attack described in [11]. Moreover, we prove this
protocol to be completely robust against an attacker Eve that
can do anything allowed by the laws of quantum physics, in-
cluding the possibility of sending multi-photon pulses (namely,
assuming that Eve may use any quantum state consisting of the
two modes |0〉 and |1〉: that is, any superposition of the Fock
states |m1,m0〉).
We can describe the new protocol in terms of photon pulses
that correspond to two distinct time-bins, and of a controllable
mirror operated by Alice: in this case, the CTRL operation
corresponds to operating the mirror on both pulses (reflecting
both pulses back to the originator, Bob); the SWAP-10 opera-
tion corresponds to operating the mirror only on the |0〉 pulse
while measuring the other pulse (and similarly for the SWAP-
01 operation and the |1〉 pulse); and the SWAP-ALL operation
corresponds to measuring all the pulses, without reflecting any
of them.
For the experimental implementation, we note that a (very
slow) mechanically-moved mirror is trivial to implement; a
much faster device can be electronically implemented by using
standard optical elements (that are commonly used in QKD): a
Pockels cell (that can change the polarization of the photon(s)
in one of the pulses) and a polarizing beam splitter (that makes
it possible to split the two different pulses into two paths, be-
cause they are now differently polarized). Like other (fast)
QKD experimental settings, implementation is feasible but is
not trivial.
Let Alice’s initial probe be in the vacuum state |0,0〉A, and
let us assume that a single photon is arriving from Bob; thus,
the system as a whole can be described as a 4-level system
(a single photon in four modes). Alice’s operations are as
follows:
I (CTRL): Do nothing:
I |0,0〉A |m1,m0〉B = |0,0〉A |m1,m0〉B (1)
S1 (SWAP-10): Swap half of Alice’s probe (the left mode)
with the |m1〉B half of Bob’s state:
S1 |0,0〉A |m1,m0〉B = |m1,0〉A |0,m0〉B (2)
S0 (SWAP-01): Swap half of Alice’s probe (the right mode)
with the |m0〉B half of Bob’s state:
S0 |0,0〉A |m1,m0〉B = |0,m0〉A |m1,0〉B (3)
S (SWAP-ALL): Swap the entire probe of Alice with the en-
tire state |m1,m0〉B of Bob:
S |0,0〉A |m1,m0〉B = |m1,m0〉A |0,0〉B (4)
After each of the three SWAP operations, Alice measures
her probe (the |·〉A state) in the computational basis and
sends to Bob the |·〉B state. If there is no noise and no
eavesdropping, and if we analyze the “ideal case” (in which
exactly one photon is arriving from Bob to Alice), then
each round is described by the four-dimensional Hilbert space
Span{|0,0〉A |0,1〉B, |0,0〉A |1,0〉B, |0,1〉A |0,0〉B, |1,0〉A |0,0〉B}
— namely, by a four-level system; for our protocol, we use
this four-level system instead of the qubit used by BB84 and
by many other QKD schemes. In the most general “theoretical
attack” (the attack analyzed by standard QKD security proofs),
Eve attacks Alice’s and Bob’s states using any probe of her
choice, but she cannot modify the four-dimensional Hilbert
space of the protocol: she can only use those four levels.
However, in practical attacks (as analyzed in our robustness
analysis), Eve may use an extended Hilbert space (the entire
Fock space).
While Eve is fully powerful, it is common to assume that Al-
ice and Bob are limited to use only current technology. In par-
ticular, Alice and Bob are limited in the sense that they cannot
count the number of photons in each mode, but can only check
3TABLE I. The four possible measurement results by Alice or Bob
(measuring in the computational basis), depending on the state ob-
tained by him or her (that is represented in the Fock space notations).
Obtained State Measurement Result “Sum”
|0,0〉 00 0
|0,m0〉 (m0 > 0) 01 1
|m1,0〉 (m1 > 0) 10 1
|m1,m0〉 (m1 > 0,m0 > 0) 11 2
whether a detector corresponding to a specific mode clicks (de-
tects at least one photon in that mode) or not (detects an empty
mode). For our protocol to be practical (and for our robustness
analysis to be stronger), we assume that Alice and Bob are
indeed limited in that sense. Therefore, when Alice and Bob
measure in the computational basis, their measurement results
are denoted as mˆ1mˆ0, with mˆ0, mˆ1 ∈ {0,1}. Similarly, when
Bob measures in the Hadamard basis, his measurement result
is mˆ−mˆ+, with mˆ+, mˆ− ∈ {0,1}.
This limitation leads to the definition of “sum”, as follows:
let us look at a measurement result of Alice or Bob (that is 00,
01, 10, or 11). The “sum” of this measurement result is the
number of distinct modes detected to be non-empty during the
measurement (namely, the sum of the digits in the measurement
result). This definition is summarized in Table I.
The protocol consists of the following steps:
1. In each of the N rounds, Bob sends to Alice the state
|+〉B; Alice randomly chooses one of her four classi-
cal operations (CTRL, SWAP-10, SWAP-01, or SWAP-
ALL) and sends the result back to Bob; and Bob mea-
sures the state he receives, choosing randomly whether
to measure in the computational basis or in the Hadamard
basis.
2. Alice reveals her operation choices (CTRL, SWAP-x
(x ∈ {01,10}), or SWAP-ALL; Alice does not reveal
her choices between SWAP-10 and SWAP-01, that she
keeps as a secret bit string), and Bob reveals his basis
choices. They discard all CTRL bits Bob measured in
the computational basis and all SWAP-x bits he mea-
sured in the Hadamard basis.
3. For each of the SWAP-x and SWAP-ALL states, Alice
and Bob reveal the “sums” of their measurement results.
4. Alice and Bob interpret their measurement results: they
consider several types of measurement results as errors,
losses, or valid results. See Tables II- IV for the details.
5. For all the SWAP-x (x∈ {01,10}) states, if Bob’s “sum”
is 1 and Alice’s “sum” is 0, then Alice and Bob share
a (secret) bit b, because Alice knows (in secret) what
operation S1−b she performed, and Bob knows (in secret)
what mode |b〉 he detected. Each one of Alice and Bob
keeps this sequence of bits b as his or her bit string.
TABLE II. Interpretations of Bob’s measurement results for CTRL
states.
Bob’s Result Interpretation
00 a loss
01 (i.e., |+〉) a legal result
10 (i.e., |−〉) an error
11 an error
TABLE III. Interpretations of Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results
for SWAP-x states.
Alice’s “Sum” Bob’s “Sum” Interpretation
0 0 a loss
0 1 Alice and Bob share a bit
1 0 Alice and Bob do not share a bit
1 1 an error
0 or 1 2 an error
2 impossible
6. Alice and Bob reveal some random subset of their bit
strings, compare them, and estimate the error rate (this
is the error rate in the way from Alice back to Bob).
They abort the protocol if the error rate in those bits,
or any of the error rates measured in Step 4, is above a
specified threshold. They discard the revealed bits.
7. Alice and Bob perform error correction and privacy am-
plification processes on the remaining bit string, yielding
a final key that is identical for Alice and Bob and is fully
secure from any eavesdropper.
Notice that Bob does not have a special role in the beginning:
he always generates the same state, |+〉. It is even possible that
the adversary Eve generates this state instead of him.
V. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
To prove robustness, we will prove that for Eve’s attack to
be undetectable by Alice and Bob (namely, for Eve’s attack
TABLE IV. Interpretations of Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results
for SWAP-ALL states.
Alice’s Result Bob’s Result Interpretation
00 00 a loss
01 or 10 00 a legal result
11 00 an error
01, 10, or 11 an error
4not to cause any errors), it must not give Eve any information.
Eve’s attack on a state can be performed in both directions:
from the source (Bob) to Alice, Eve applies U ; from Alice
back to Bob, Eve appliesV . We may assume, without limiting
generality, that Eve uses a fixed probe spaceHE for her attacks.
According to the definition of robustness, we will prove that
if, during a run of the protocol, no error can be detected by
Alice and Bob, then Eve gets no information on the raw key.
If Alice and Bob cannot find any error, the following con-
ditions must be satisfied for all the measurement results that
were not discarded due to basis mismatch:
1. For all CTRL states, Bob’s measurement result (in the
Hadamard basis) must not be 10 or 11 (namely, Bob
must never detect any photon in the |−〉 mode).
2. For all SWAP-x states, Alice’s “sum” and Bob’s “sum”
(in the computational basis) must not be both 1.
3. For all SWAP-x states, Bob’s “sum” (in the computa-
tional basis) must not be 2 (namely, Bob’s measurement
result must not be 11).
4. For all SWAP-x states, no error (that may be detected
during the protocol) can exist. In other words:
(a) For all SWAP-10 states, Bob’s measurement result
(in the computational basis) must not be 10.
(b) For all SWAP-01 states, Bob’s measurement result
(in the computational basis) must not be 01.
5. For all SWAP-ALL states, Alice’s measurement result
must not be 11.
6. For all SWAP-ALL states, Bob’s measurement result
must not be 01, 10, or 11.
We now analyze each round of the protocol. After the round
begins, the source (Bob) sends to Alice the state |0,1〉x,B ∈HB.
Eve can now interfere: she attaches her own probe state (in the
Hilbert space HE) and applies the unitary transformation U .
The resulting Bob+Eve state (including Eve’s probe) is of the
form
|ψinit〉, ∑
m1,m0
|m1,m0〉B |Em1,m0〉E, (5)
where |Ei, j〉E are non-normalized vectors inHE.
Condition 5 means that |Em1,m0〉E = 0 for all m1,m0 satis-
fying m1 > 0 and m0 > 0. Therefore,
|ψinit〉= |ϕ1,0〉+ |ϕ0,1〉+ |ϕ0,0〉, (6)
with
|ϕ1,0〉, ∑
m1>0
|m1,0〉B |Em1,0〉E, (7)
|ϕ0,1〉, ∑
m0>0
|0,m0〉B |E0,m0〉E, (8)
|ϕ0,0〉, |0,0〉B |E0,0〉E. (9)
TABLE V. The (non-normalized) state of the Bob+Eve system after
Alice’s operation, given Alice’s “sum”. Note that the states |ϕ1,0〉,
|ϕ0,1〉, and |ϕ0,0〉 are defined in (7)-(9).
Operation Alice Bob+Eve State
CTRL |ψCTRL〉, |ϕ1,0〉+ |ϕ0,1〉+ |ϕ0,0〉
SWAP-10 0 |ψ(0)S-10〉, |ϕ0,1〉+ |ϕ0,0〉
SWAP-01 0 |ψ(0)S-01〉, |ϕ1,0〉+ |ϕ0,0〉
SWAP-10 1 ρ(1)S-10 , ∑m1>0 |0,0〉B〈0,0|⊗ |Em1,0〉E〈Em1,0|
SWAP-01 1 ρ(1)S-01 , ∑m0>0 |0,0〉B〈0,0|⊗ |E0,m0〉E〈E0,m0 |
SWAP-ALL ρS-ALL , ρ(1)S-10+ρ
(1)
S-01+ |ϕ0,0〉〈ϕ0,0|
Alice now applies one of the four possible operations (CTRL
= I, SWAP-10 = S1, SWAP-01 = S0, or SWAP-ALL = S) and
destructively measures her probe state. The (non-normalized)
state of the Bob+Eve system after Alice’s operation (and mea-
surement) is written in Table V.
Then, Eve applies a second unitary transformationV on the
state sent from Alice to Bob (and on her own probe state).
According to conditions 2, 3, and 6, the density matrices
Vρ(1)S-10V
†, Vρ(1)S-01V
†, and VρS-ALLV † must only overlap with
|0,0〉B. It follows that there exists |H0,0〉E ∈HE such that
V |ϕ0,0〉= |0,0〉B |H0,0〉E. (10)
Let V |ϕ1,0〉= ∑m1,m0 |m1,m0〉B |Fm1,m0〉E. Let us look at a
SWAP-01 state for which Alice’s “sum” is 0. For this state,
the Bob+Eve state after Eve’s attack is
V |ψ(0)S-01〉=V |ϕ1,0〉+V |ϕ0,0〉 (11)
= ∑
m1,m0
|m1,m0〉B |Fm1,m0〉E+ |0,0〉B |H0,0〉E,
and following conditions 4b and 3, Bob must not detect a pho-
ton in the |0〉 mode (otherwise, the error may be detected dur-
ing the protocol). Therefore, |Fm1,m0〉E = 0 for all m0 > 0. It
follows that
V |ϕ1,0〉= ∑
m1>0
|m1,0〉B |Fm1,0〉E+ |0,0〉B |F0,0〉E. (12)
Similarly (following conditions 4a and 3),
V |ϕ0,1〉= ∑
m0>0
|0,m0〉B |G0,m0〉E+ |0,0〉B |G0,0〉E. (13)
Now, (10), (12), and (13) imply that if Alice applies CTRL,
the Bob+Eve state after Eve’s attack is
V |ψCTRL〉= ∑
m>0
[ |m,0〉B |Fm,0〉E+ |0,m〉B |G0,m〉E]+ |0,0〉B |H〉E
(14)
with |H〉E = |F0,0〉E+ |G0,0〉E+ |H0,0〉E. Following condi-
tion 1, the probability of Bob getting a photon in the |−〉mode
must be 0.
We now use the following Lemma, the proof of which is
given in Appendix B:
5Lemma1. If |ψ ′〉=∑m>0 [ |m,0〉B |Fm,0〉E+ |0,m〉B |G0,m〉E]+
|0,0〉B |H〉E is a bipartite state inHB⊗HE, and if there is a
zero probability that Bob gets a photon in the |−〉 mode, then
|F1,0〉E = |G0,1〉E, and |Fm,0〉E = |G0,m〉E = 0 for all m> 1.
Applying Lemma 1, we deduce that |Fm,0〉E = |G0,m〉E = 0
for all m> 1, and that |F1,0〉E = |G0,1〉E , |F〉E.
It follows that the Bob+Eve states after Eve’s attack, when
Alice performed SWAP-x and her “sum” is 0 (those are the
only states for which Alice and Bob may share a bit), are:
V |ψ(0)S-10〉= |0,1〉B |F〉E+ |0,0〉B [ |G0,0〉E+ |H0,0〉E] (15)
V |ψ(0)S-01〉= |1,0〉B |F〉E+ |0,0〉B [ |F0,0〉E+ |H0,0〉E] (16)
Therefore, the state of Eve’s probe is independent of all Alice’s
and Bob’s shared bits, and is equal to |F〉E whenever Alice and
Bob share a bit. Eve can thus get no information on the bits
shared by Alice and Bob without being detected.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a new semiquantum key distribution pro-
tocol, and have proved it robust (security analysis is left for the
future). Unlike all the previous SQKD protocols, our new
protocol can be experimentally implemented in a secure way.
In this paper, we have suggested a solution for a practical
security problem of SQKD protocols, that was discussed in
Sec. III and in [11]. We note that QKD protocols have, too,
some security weaknesses in their practical implementations,
such as the “Photon-Number Splitting” attack [13], the “Bright
Illumination” attack [14], the “Fixed Apparatus” attack [15],
and other practical attacks. While some of those security weak-
nesses can be mitigated, full security proofs for practical im-
plementations are still out of reach. A future extension of this
paper may check to what extent the practical implementations
of the SQKD protocols discussed in this paper suffer from the
same practical security problems as common QKD protocols,
and whether insights from SQKD protocols (and the methods
described in this paper) may help in solving practical security
problems of both SQKD and fully-quantum QKD protocols.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The work of TM and RL was partly supported by the Is-
raeli MOD Research and Technology Unit, and by the Gerald
Schwartz & Heather Reisman Foundation.
Appendix A: Fock space notations
The Fock space notations, that serve as an extension of the
qubit space, are defined as follows: the Fock basis vector |0,1〉
represents a single photon in the |0〉 state, and the Fock basis
vector |1,0〉 represents a single photon in the |1〉 state. The
vectors |0,1〉 and |1,0〉 could, for example, be two polarization
modes, two arm modes (e.g., arms entering an interferometer),
or two time-bin modes on a single arm. The qubit space (rep-
resenting a single photon in one of the two modes) can be
extended to the entire 2-mode Fock space
F = Span{|m1,m0〉 | m1 ≥ 0,m0 ≥ 0}, (A1)
where the state |m1,m0〉 represents m1 indistinguishable pho-
tons in the mode of the qubit-state |1〉 andm0 indistinguishable
photons in the mode of the qubit-state |0〉. In particular, the
state |0,0〉 ∈F is used for describing absence of photons in
both modes (the “vacuum state”).
Similarly, a single photon in the |+〉 mode may be written
as |0,1〉x (and similarly for |−〉 and |1,0〉x), and the entire
2-mode Fock space can be represented as
F = Span{|m−,m+〉x | m− ≥ 0,m+ ≥ 0}, (A2)
where the state |m−,m+〉x represents m− indistinguishable
photons in the mode of the qubit-state |−〉 and m+ indistin-
guishable photons in the mode of the qubit-state |+〉.
In this paper, we shorten the term “the mode of the qubit-
state |0〉” to “the |0〉 mode”; and similarly for |1〉, |+〉, |−〉.
Appendix B: Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. If there is a zero probability that Bob gets a photon in
the |−〉 mode, then there is a zero probability of measuring
any basis state |m−,m+〉x,B ofHB with m− > 0.
For m = 1, since |0,1〉B = |0,1〉x,B+ |1,0〉x,B√2 and |1,0〉B =
|0,1〉x,B−|1,0〉x,B√
2
, we get
|1,0〉B |F1,0〉E + |0,1〉B |G0,1〉E
=
|0,1〉x,B√
2
[ |G0,1〉E+ |F1,0〉E]
+
|1,0〉x,B√
2
[ |G0,1〉E− |F1,0〉E] . (B1)
Since the probability of getting a photon in the |−〉mode must
be 0, it is necessary that |F1,0〉E = |G0,1〉E.
For m > 1, using the ladder operators a0, a1, a+, and a−,
since a0 =
a++a−√
2
and a1 =
a+−a−√
2
, we get
|0,m〉B = a
†
0
m |0,0〉B√
m!
=
1√
2m ·m!
m
∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
a†−
k
a†+
m−k |0,0〉B (B2)
|m,0〉B = a
†
1
m |0,0〉B√
m!
=
1√
2m ·m!
m
∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
(−1)ka†−
k
a†+
m−k |0,0〉B.(B3)
From (B2) and (B3) it follows that
|m,0〉B |Fm,0〉E + |0,m〉B |G0,m〉E
= |e(m)〉B [ |G0,m〉E+ |Fm,0〉E]
+ |o(m)〉B [ |G0,m〉E− |Fm,0〉E] , (B4)
6with
|e(m)〉B = 1√
2m ·m! ∑k even
(
m
k
)
a†−
k
a†+
m−k |0,0〉B (B5)
|o(m)〉B = 1√
2m ·m! ∑k odd
(
m
k
)
a†−
k
a†+
m−k |0,0〉B, (B6)
where a†−
k
a†+
m−k |0,0〉B is, up to a constant factor, the
Fock state |k,m− k〉x,B. The probability of finding a pho-
ton in the |−〉 mode must be zero; thus, the coefficient
of a†−
k
a†+
m−k |0,0〉B for k > 0 must be zero. Substituting
|e(m)〉B and |o(m)〉B by their values in (B4), the coefficient
of a†−
k
a†+
m−k |0,0〉B is (up to a non-zero constant factor)
|G0,m〉E+ |Fm,0〉E for even k and |G0,m〉E− |Fm,0〉E for odd k.
Since k=m> 0 and k=m−1> 0 have different parities, this
implies both |G0,m〉E+ |Fm,0〉E = 0 and |G0,m〉E− |Fm,0〉E = 0,
and thus |Fm,0〉E = |G0,m〉E = 0.
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